Livelihoods after land reform in South Africa by Aliber, Michael & Cousins, Ben
Aliber, M. & Cousins, B. (2013). Livelihoods after land reform. Journal of Agrarian Change, 
13(1): 140-165 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joac.12012       
 
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository  maliber@uwc.ac.za   
 
Livelihoods after land reform in South Africa 
 
Michael Aliber and Ben Cousins 
 
Abstract 
Over the past few decades, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa have pursued 
redistributive land reform as a means to address rural poverty. The Livelihoods after Land 
Reform (LaLR) study was carried out between 2007 and 2009, to understand the 
livelihood and poverty reduction outcomes of land reform in each of the three countries. 
The South African component focused on Limpopo province, and investigated land 
reform processes, trajectories of change and outcomes in thirteen detailed case studies. 
This paper summarizes some of the main findings from the South African study, and 
briefly compares them with findings from Namibia and Zimbabwe. The paper argues that 
a fundamental problem affecting land reform in both South Africa and Namibia is the 
uncritical application of the Large-Scale Commercial Farming (LSCF) model, which has 
led to unworkable project design and/or projects that are irrelevant to the circumstances 
of the rural poor. Nevertheless, some ‘beneficiaries’ have experienced modest 
improvements in their livelihoods, often through abandoning or amending official project 
plans. 
 
Introduction 
Redistributive land reform has been pursued in South Africa over the past two decades. In 
South Africa at present, there is near-consensus that land reform has been unsuccessful, 
but a startling lack of agreement as to its problems and what remedies should be 
administered. Broadly, land reform is criticized both for its pace – about 8 per cent of 
commercial farmland redistributed over 18 years versus the 30 per cent over 5 years 
initially targeted – and its performance: the livelihoods (and production) outcomes on 
the 8 per cent of redistributed land on which this paper focuses. 
 
A number of explanations have been offered for poor livelihoods and production 
outcomes, including: poor extension and other support to land reform ‘beneficiaries’ 
(Jacobs et al. 2003; Manenzhe 2007);1 inadequate beneficiary skills (e.g. CRLR 2004); 
too little money spent (and thus land transferred) per beneficiary (Jacobs et al. 2003); an 
economy that is hostile to small-scale entrepreneurs generally, whether in agriculture or 
off-farm (Philip and Hassen 2008); and a failure to subdivide large farms (Aliber and 
Mokoena 2003), by some accounts due to resistance from ‘a conservative coalition of state 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘land reform beneficiaries’ is used in mainstream policy discourse to denote individuals or households who 
are official recipients of assistance from South Africa’s land reform programme. While the term is not ideal (e.g. it 
implies passivity), we use it here for convenience, from now on without quotation marks. 
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and private sector interests . . .’ (Lahiff 2010, 60). While each of these explanations may 
have some merit, this paper argues that the more fundamental problem is the South 
African state’s stubborn commitment to the LSCF model of agriculture, notwithstanding 
the rhetorical embrace of smallholder agriculture in some policy documents. 
 
The Livelihoods after Land Reform (LaLR) study, for which the fieldwork was carried out 
between 2007 and 2009, sought to understand the livelihood and poverty reduction 
outcomes of land reform in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.A specific aim was to 
identify how the livelihood outcomes of land reform are conditioned by policy-makers’ 
and implementers’ conceptions of ‘viability’. This paper summarizes some of the main 
findings from the South African component of LaLR, which investigated land reform 
processes, trajectories of change and livelihood outcomes in thirteen detailed case studies 
drawn from two district municipalities, Vhembe and Capricorn, within what we refer to as 
‘central-north Limpopo province’. A secondary purpose is to compare these with the 
findings for the other two countries in the study. Both commonalities and differences are 
identified and briefly discussed. 
 
For the South African case, the paper demonstrates that commitment to the LSCF model 
is subtly but powerfully evident in the ways in which land reform implementation systems 
are designed and deployed. Where the application of the LSCF model functions at all (i.e. 
where land reform beneficiaries manage to ‘farm productively’, leaving aside for now 
precisely what this means), the poverty reduction benefits are typically insignificant; this 
merely reflects the manner in which the characteristic capital-intensity of the LSCF model 
is out of sync with South Africa’s rural unemployment crisis. More generally, the LSCF 
model fails to take into account social realities, not least the abilities and aspirations of 
rural dwellers, and results in ‘land reform projects’ that are intrinsically unworkable and 
prone to collapse. While planners’ collective thrall to the concept of ‘viability’ is possibly 
the most tangible manifestation of how the LSCF model informs the implementation of 
land reform, it is also, ironically, the lens through which the deficiencies of land reform 
policies are viewed by policy-makers. Thus, for example, when it became evident in the 
late 1990s that the land redistribution programme was plagued with problems of project 
collapse and idle land, government concluded that the problem was an inadequate 
adherence to the principle of viability, rather than a misapplication of the principle itself. 
And yet, as the paper also seeks to demonstrate, close inspection of land reform projects 
reveals instances in which beneficiaries have managed to work outside the restrictions 
imposed by policy, hinting at ways in which the government’s approach to land reform 
could be usefully revised. 
 
The paper confirms that the LSCF model has cast a long shadow in all three countries 
studied. Namibia seems the most extreme case, where the rigid norms associated with 
extensive livestock farming have translated into top-down imposition of farm business 
plans that are inappropriate to many would-be beneficiaries’ aspirations and asset levels. 
Zimbabwe’s land reform was similarly handicapped by the over-zealous application of the 
LSCF model, but under the A1 schemes of the Fast Track Resettlement Programme, a 
much greater range of farming models was accommodated, which accounts for 
discernibly more positive livelihood impacts, notwithstanding an unusually harsh 
macroeconomic environment. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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South Africa’s inherited agrarian structure and tentative Agrarian reform 
South Africa’s ‘dualistic’ agrarian structure comprises around 35,000 large-scale, mostly 
whiteowned commercial farms, occupying the majority of the country’s agricultural land 
and producing almost all marketed output, and a much larger number of small-scale, 
black farmers, largely confined to the ex-Bantustans (approximately 4 million, located in 
around 2 million households; Aliber et al. 2009, 4).This latter group is quite diverse, both 
in scale and orientation; most produce mainly for subsistence purposes and as a 
supplementary source of food, and a smaller number (around 200,000) mainly in order 
to generate monetary income. According to the 2002 agricultural census, about 5 per cent 
of large-scale commercial farming units accounted for about half of aggregate gross farm 
income, and more than 60 per cent of aggregate net farm income (Stats SA 2005). This 
dualism has not been much reduced by post-apartheid land reform. The main thrust of 
agricultural policy after 1994 was deregulation and liberalization, which appears to have 
facilitated higher levels of concentration of land ownership rather than opening up space 
for smallholders, as some economists argued (van Zyl 1996). 
 
At the onset of democracy in 1994, the thinking of the incoming ANC government was 
bold and reasonably clear: it would pursue an agrarian reform that would restructure 
agriculture, replacing then dominant large-scale commercial farmers with smallholders. 
This aspiration was part and parcel of the ANC’s 1994, Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP): 
 
A national land reform programme is the central and driving force of a programme of 
rural development. Such a programme aims to address effectively the injustices of forced 
removals and the historical denial of access to land . . . [I]n implementing the national 
land reform programme, and through the provision of support services, the democratic 
government will build the economy by generating large-scale employment, increasing 
rural incomes and eliminating overcrowding. (ANC 1994, §2.4.2) 
 
The RDP was unambiguous as to the superiority of small-scale farming, making subtle 
but clear references to two economic precepts, namely the ‘inverse farm-size productivity 
relationship’ and the ‘improved local multiplier argument’. The RDP also indicated that 
land reform would have three main components: redistribution, through which people 
would seek assistance to acquire land for farming and/or settlement; restitution, 
involving the restoration of land, or the provision of alternative compensation, to the 
victims of forced removals; and tenure reform, to improve the tenure security of the 
population of the ex-Bantustans and ‘Coloured reserves’, as well as of farm dwellers and 
workers on commercial farms. How these programmes would operate was set out in a 
1997 White Paper on Land Policy (DLA 1997). 
 
Beyond the stated intentions of the RDP, it is evident that at least part of government’s 
emerging land reform programme was indeed geared towards helping small-scale 
farmers. Thus the original funding modality for the redistribution programme consisted 
of a grant of R15,000 per household, when the average price of land on the market at the 
time was about R900 per hectare. However, how redistribution was actually implemented 
up to around 2000 had little to do with small-scale farmers. Rather, in a manner 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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reminiscent of Zimbabwe’s Model B resettlement projects of the 1980s, which were 
structured as co-operatives, land redistribution projects tended to consist of beneficiary 
groups who pooled their settlement and land acquisition (SLAG) grants in order to 
acquire land, which they then generally attempted to farm as a group. There is now 
almost universal agreement that this was a mistake, and accounted for the widespread 
collapse of SLAG-financed projects (Lahiff 2007, 1589; Hall 2011, 221). In any event, the 
impacts of redistribution on livelihoods were questioned, which ultimately meant the end 
of SLAG as the primary funding vehicle for redistribution. 
 
In 2001, a new redistribution vehicle was unveiled under the name ‘Land Redistribution 
for Agricultural Development’ (LRAD). This new policy was ostensibly non-prescriptive, 
allowing for group projects as well as subdivision, but stated that group projects ‘will be 
discouraged’ (MALA 2001, 4). However, the discouragement of group-based production 
was not balanced by favouring or facilitating subdivision of land acquired through group 
purchases.  
 
LRAD allowed for a far larger grant, ranging from R20,000 to R100,000, with ‘own 
contributions’ ranging from R5,000 at the lower end (which could be paid in kind, 
including through ‘sweat equity’ labour), to R400,000 at the upper end of the scale. One 
of the stated aims of LRAD was to create a significant class of black commercial farmers 
who would acquire entire farms but without abandoning the rural poor, who could pursue 
‘food safety net projects’; support for farming in communal areas would also be provided 
(Jacobs et al. 2003, 4). In 2008, when the grants provided by LRAD still proved 
inadequate for the purpose of enabling families to acquire entire farms, they were 
increased to a maximum of R431,000 (Aliber and Hall 2010, 20). The consequence was 
projects to redistribute larger areas of land to individuals, but with many fewer 
beneficiaries. 
 
The trajectory of the rural restitution programme reveals a less dramatic change in 
approach, seemingly because there is less latitude in how to define a ‘restitution project’: 
the identity of the beneficiaries and the land are mainly governed by the nature of the 
dispossession, rather than by government’s prevailing development model. Indeed, 
whereas in redistribution there was a concerted attempt to move away from group 
farming projects, in restitution this was not a meaningful option, because the group 
nature of most rural claims is a given. The question remains whether government might 
have considered subdividing restitution projects, at least as a menu option, but there is no 
evidence that this has happened. Indeed, many rural restitution projects have so many 
claimant members that subdivision is impractical even by the standards of most hard-
core smallholder enthusiasts. Among other things, this simple observation reveals the 
extent to which the population has grown in the intervening decades between 
dispossession and restoration (Walker 2008). 
 
The 1997 White Paper on Land Policy made little mention of how land reform objectives 
would be supported by agricultural policies, mirrored by a corresponding failure to 
integrate land reform into agricultural policy. The Department of Agriculture prioritized 
policies of deregulation and liberalization, focused on the abolition of subsidies on credit, 
inputs and exports, and dismantling single-channel marketing schemes and their 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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administered prices. A new Marketing Act of 1996 aimed to increase market access for all 
‘market participants’ (a euphemism for new black commercial farmers), promote 
efficiency, optimize export earnings and enhance the viability of agriculture (van 
Schalkwyk et al. 2003, 128). The White Paper on Agriculture of 1995 (Department of 
Agriculture 1995, 12) stated that state interventions in marketing should be ‘limited to the 
correction of market imperfections and socially unacceptable effects’. These policy 
frameworks enabled the continued consolidation of large-scale commercial farming (see 
Bernstein in this special issue). 
 
One interpretation of these seemingly contradictory developments is that, 
notwithstanding some effort to promote a small-scale farming model in rhetoric or policy, 
there was a strong continuity in dominant thinking about agriculture from pre- to post-
1994, largely because ANC governments relied on the existing fund of ‘expert knowledge’, 
which took for granted the desirability of agricultural modernization and economies of 
scale (Hebinck et al. 2011) centred on the twin concepts of ‘viability’ and ‘efficiency’. 
‘Viability’ is typically understood as a minimum, economically feasible farm size (Cousins 
and Scoones 2010) – appropriately differentiated by type of cropping or animal 
husbandry activity – below which farmers will always struggle. The trajectory of South 
Africa’s commercial farming sector towards fewer and larger production units (Vink and 
van Rooyen 2009) is meanwhile taken as evidence of the efficiencies inherent in 
‘economies of scale’, whose tendency is to push the viability threshold ever upwards. 
 
Agriculture and land reform in Limpopo province 
The agro-ecological conditions for commercial farming in central-north Limpopo are 
characterized by stark contrasts, subsuming areas of high and low soil fertility, and good 
and poor rainfall. Accordingly, mixed farming systems are rare compared to farms 
specializing in extensive livestock ranching, on one hand, or intensive, irrigated orchard 
farming, on the other. Irrigation is mainly practised to enhance productivity in areas that 
already have high rainfall, rather than in arid areas to compensate for poor rainfall. This 
means that the trend over the past several decades towards a drier climate is felt most 
acutely in areas that were relatively dry to begin with. However, high-rainfall areas in 
which irrigation is practised are themselves under increasing water stress (DWAF 2004, 
vii). 
 
This is perhaps one reason why changes in the LSCF sector of central-north Limpopo over 
the past 50 years or so are an exaggerated version of national trends. The pattern typical 
of South Africa as a whole is that the number of farming units peaked in the mid-
twentieth century, following by a steady decline to the present; but whereas the national 
trend is only a modest decline in the area under commercial farming, in central-north 
Limpopo the amount of land in commercial farming has declined by about half, while the 
number of units has dropped by 70 per cent. 
 
This has been accompanied by a large decrease in farm employment. The number of 
regular farm workers declined from over 16,000 in 1952 to fewer than 5,000 in 2002 
(Bureau of Census and Statistics 1953; Stats SA 2005), while the number of 
seasonal/casual farm workers followed a similar trend. As of March 2007, commercial 
agriculture in central-north Limpopo absorbed only 3.3 per cent and 2.0 per cent of the 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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labour force in Vhembe and Capricorn districts, respectively. However, despite the 
collapse of black agriculture during the twentieth century, participation in largely 
‘subsistence’ agriculture in the ex-Bantustans is widespread: the share of black 
households practising agriculture at some scale is 66.8 per cent in Vhembe and 50.2 per 
cent in Capricorn (Table 1). For the rural population of central-north Limpopo, the 
importance of agriculture lies not mainly in farm jobs, but in smallholdings and gardens 
in the communal areas of the ex-Bantustans. 
 
At the time the study began in 2007, there were 119 land reform projects in Capricorn and 
Vhembe Districts, of which 81 were redistribution projects and 36 restitution projects. A 
census of the projects was conducted in order to get an overview of their status, and to lay 
a basis for selecting projects for in-depth case studies. As of late 2007: for 46 per cent of 
projects, project land was completely idle; for 40 per cent, at least some beneficiary 
activity on the land was discernible; 3 per cent had no beneficiary involvement, with some 
or all project land leased out; and for 10 per cent of projects, no information was 
obtainable, most likely suggesting that their land was also idle. The project census also 
established that among the 40 per cent of projects with at least some activity on the land, 
on most the numbers farming were dramatically less than the numbers of official 
beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
Project case studies and stylized trajectories 
From among the 40 per cent of projects in the census with some farming, forty-seven 
projects in all, thirteen were selected as subjects for case studies. Each case study involved 
up to six different fieldwork activities, namely: land-use mapping, household surveys, in-
depth individual interviews, focus group discussions, enterprise profiling and key 
informant interviews (including, where possible, with former owners). The mix and 
intensity of fieldwork activities varied from one case study project to another, largely 
because of the differences in the projects themselves – not least the numbers of 
beneficiaries, which varied from one to 1,000 households. Some projects were studied in 
relatively little depth as they have been well covered in other studies2. 
 
Analytically, it is useful to distinguish land reform projects according to the three main 
types that prevailed up to 2009, namely SLAG-based redistribution projects, LRAD-based 
redistribution projects and restitution projects. Table 2 lists the project case studies 
accordingly, and indicates some of their basic parameters. Two key features to note are: 
                                                 
2
 The main example of this is Levubu, in fact a cluster of five large, complex restitution projects in the Levubu Valley, 
studied by Fraser (2007), Derman et al. (2010) and Lahiff et al. (2012). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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(a) changes in land use following the transfer of land; and (b) the much lower numbers of 
beneficiaries in May 2009 compared to those listed as beneficiaries in official planning 
documents (with the notable exception of Munzhedzi). 
 
The thirteen detailed case studies are reported in Aliber et al. (forthcoming). In what 
follows, we present one abbreviated case study for each of the three main types of land 
reform, together with stylized trajectories for that project type. 
 
SLAG-Based Land Redistribution Projects, 1995–2000: Case study of 
Rustfontein farm/Makhamotse.  
The Rustfontein farm became part of land reform at the initiative of its owner, David L, 
who employed ten permanent and twenty-four temporary workers. According to his 
former employees, David decided to sell the farm because he was getting old and his son 
was not interested in taking over. One day in 1998, he called a meeting of his workers to 
inform them of his intention to sell the farm, and that if interested they could acquire it 
themselves. He explained that they would have to complete some forms and submit them 
to the government. Although in this particular case the workers were fond of their boss, 
they were delighted at the prospect of becoming owners: ‘we were very happy and thought 
that we are now rich looking at the success that Mr L was achieving’. 
 
David L’s asking price for the farm was R1.8 million. An estate agent helped him 
understand how the SLAG policy worked, and advised him to request his workers to 
recruit additional applicants from the local area, in practice from Sekgopo, a 
conglomeration of villages in a communal area only a few kilometres from the boundary 
of Rustfontein. Another one of David L’s former employees, Joshua, referred to this estate 
agent, as ‘. . . another lady who was running the programme for land reform’, suggesting 
the extent to which SLAG was propelled by the interests of sellers rather than the needs of 
people seeking land. Ultimately, the SLAG application included 121 households, and the 
pooled grants came to R1.94 million, allowing a small surplus after paying for the land 
that could be used for operational expenses. 
 
Thus Rustfontein farm became the Makhamotse land reform project in 2000. It consisted 
of 10 hectares of fruit orchards, 26 hectares under a variety of cash crops, 500 hectares of 
blue gum plantations and about 800 hectares of grazing land. As with most SLAG and 
restitution projects, a Communal Property Association (CPA) was constituted in order to 
take ownership of the land, as provided for in the Communal Property Associations Act of 
1996. The beneficiary members then elected a committee to run the CPA’s affairs. 
 
Of the 121 households, ten were those of former farm workers, and the others were 
recruits from Sekgopo. Joshua suggests that these recruits were mainly relatives of the 
farm workers who recruited them. Key informants from Sekgopo said of land reform in 
general that most recruited beneficiaries were merely asked to allow the use of their ID 
numbers to boost the applicant numbers, which suggests that they had no real interest in 
what happened at Rustfontein. Onica M, another erstwhile farm worker who became a 
beneficiary, said that ‘government officials confronted people in this area asking for IDs’. 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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What expectations did the recruited villagers themselves hold? Unfortunately, we failed to 
get direct access to their views, because violence that erupted shortly before our fieldwork 
began made contacting them difficult. However, Joshua gives possible clues. Asked 
whether the beneficiaries had ever considered subdividing the farm to allocate people 
their own plots, Joshua responded, ‘Some [people] were interested in that, but we saw 
that it won’t be the good way for business. Yeah, I can say it was a discussion.’ And then: 
‘We tried [to make the project work], but some of the people had never worked before.’ It 
would seem that the ‘we’ to whom Joshua refers are the former farm workers, in whose 
minds the ‘good way for business’ was to preserve the commercial farming enterprises of 
the previous owner, their employer. It is likely that those wishing to discuss subdivision 
were the recruited villagers, at least some of whom were clearly not passively allowing the 
use of the ID numbers. While we do not know how many were actively farmers, it is 
probably relevant that Sekgopo is fringed by 100–150 communal area smallholdings with 
various agricultural activities. According to Onica, ‘Things were not going well when they 
started the project and it was because of the large number of people, and the people were 
uncontrollable. As a result, people were only working as they wished. It was difficult to tell 
a person to work as they didn’t have anyone to supervise them.’ Onica also betrays an 
assumption that farming should be pursued in a particular way, namely with clear lines of 
authority and control. 
 
The conflicts within the Makhamotse project may well have had multiple dimensions, but 
it seems clear that the difference of views about farming models was key. In effect, land 
reform at Rustfontein was initiated by the seller, was conceptualized as a large-scale 
commercial farming operation by the former farm workers who formed the core of the 
beneficiary group, and was implemented on this basis with no serious regard for the 
wishes and circumstances of the villagers recruited to make up the bulk of the beneficiary 
group. 
 
What happened at Makhamotse in the years following transfer was fairly typical of SLAG 
based redistribution projects: declining production, lack of infrastructure maintenance 
and reinvestment, and paralysed decision-making. Around 2005, Joshua emerged as the 
new leader of the project. For 3 years, Makhamotse showed signs of recovery, but then its 
troubles became more extreme. Some recruited villagers who had been sidelined 
sabotaged the project through theft and arson, physically assaulting Joshua on one 
occasion and chasing him away on another. 
 
By 2010, production had ceased altogether, and only a few households from among the 
original farm workers remained. Joshua, who was born and raised on Rustfontein, ended 
up as a tenant on another farm in the area (ironically, another abandoned land 
redistribution project), deeply in debt, living alone and trying to make a fresh start with 
some cattle borrowed from a local white farmer. 
 
Trajectories of SLAG-based projects.  
SLAG-based projects in the study began in the same way: farm workers and other 
beneficiaries recruited from nearby communal areas were brought together in a group 
project by a would-be seller; that is, they were seller-driven.  The next step was also 
common: a dramatic decline in the number of active members, together with a drop in 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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agricultural production – what we refer to in Figure 1 as ‘partial collapse’. At this stage, it 
is useful to note what is not observed (indicated with dashed lines): any SLAG projects 
maintaining continuity in either active membership or in production, or any projects 
subdividing the land and allocating it to individual beneficiaries. This is not to say that 
these two alternative trajectories never occur, but we are not aware of any such cases in 
Limpopo, and surmise that they are rare. The non-occurrence of subdivision following 
land redistribution is a much-discussed policy issue in South Africa (van den Brink et al. 
2006; Lahiff 2007). 
 
From ‘partial collapse’, we observed three different trajectories and note one that was not 
observed (project recovery in terms of both production and active membership). By 
contrast, what was observed was the following: 
 
(i) A very small core of residual active members manage to rescue the project, as 
happened at Fanang Diatla, followed by an expansion of production and an increase in 
the number of employees. The fact that Fanang Diatla did not try to invite back some of 
the departed beneficiaries is interesting, but it seems clear why not – the remaining core 
membership wishes to maintain control of the farm, which it can do with employed 
workers, but not necessarily if other beneficiaries return. 
 
(ii) An outside investor or lessee arrives and restarts production, employing some 
remaining beneficiaries and possibly others. We know from elsewhere in Limpopo that 
the investor or lessee can be an established white commercial farmer, but in our cases 
these were local black entrepreneurs seeking to rent land from SLAG beneficiaries as a 
means of diversifying into agriculture, and who then hire some of the beneficiaries as 
farm workers. 
 
 
 
This was the trajectory for Marobala Chicken and Mmatshehla, which were probably on 
track to collapse altogether, but were revived to some degree by the arrival of an external 
investor with some capital and entrepreneurial know-how. We cannot predict what might 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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happen next; at Marobala Chicken there was some indication that the investor might have 
withdrawn, in which case complete collapse looked inevitable. Another logical possibility 
is that after some successful seasons, the investor could withdraw and the remaining 
beneficiaries would be able to continue in his absence. A third possibility is that the 
investor could end up taking over the project completely; at one stage, this was a fear 
expressed by remaining project members at Marobala Chicken, perhaps because the 
investor was employing as many people from his own village as them, the owners of the 
land. 
 
(iii) Another distinct possibility is that the project goes from ‘partial collapse’ to ‘full 
collapse’, as with Makhamotse. However, it is not entirely clear how significant the 
distinction is between ‘partial collapse’ and ‘full collapse’; certainly it is difficult 
empirically to draw a clear line between the two. We are aware of numerous SLAG 
projects outside of our case studies where land has ended up as completely idle or leased 
out to a non-project member; for example, a white farmer. We could also imagine, on the 
other hand, that remaining beneficiaries or someone else starts making use of the idle 
land, whether or not it is formally subdivided. 
 
The distinction between leasing out and entering into a joint venture is somewhat 
ambiguous. From the perspective of the few remaining beneficiaries, the difference is real 
in that wages tend to be more significant than (a share of) the rather low rental income. 
However, in the case of Marobala Chicken, the ‘joint venture’ option exposed a hazard: 
the investor at one stage appeared poised to take over the project, seemingly with the 
consent and support of government officials. Of course, the same might occur in projects 
where land is leased out, but we have not observed any such cases. 
 
Deference to the LSCF model is the main explanation for the design of SLAG-based 
redistribution projects predicated on preserving the previous owner’s approach to 
production, and in particular the failure to subdivide properties when they are transferred 
or later. The consequence is unworkable ‘projects’ that either adapt or die. Different forms 
of adaptation are observed, the most auspicious of which is Fanang Diatla. One aspect of 
its adaptation was its dramatic shrinkage in active membership, from forty-nine to three 
beneficiaries. Another relates to the question of ‘employment’. Characteristically, newly 
launched SLAG-based projects are designed so that project beneficiaries treat themselves 
as employees who earn a regular wage, rather than farmer–entrepreneurs who claim the 
residual after all other expenses have been paid. Following the near-collapse of Fanang 
Diatla, the remaining beneficiaries stopped behaving like beneficiary–employees and 
more like farmer–entrepreneurs. As their enterprise grew, they needed to hire additional 
workers, and for the most part were able to do so. But the rigours of farming made 
responsibility for paying regular wages difficult, and they required their employees to 
adopt some of the same flexibility and patience that they were forced to exercise 
themselves. In other words, they assimilated to a model of commercial farming more akin 
to that still prevalent in the former homelands than in the LSCF sector. 
 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
12 
 
LRAD-Based Land Redistribution Projects, 2001–2009: Case study of 
Schaaphoek farm/Sadiki Cattle Enterprise.  
Schaaphoek was a white-owned cattle farm established in the 1920s, became an LRAD 
project (Sadiki Cattle Enterprise) in 2005, and was transferred to the Nthabalala 
community through the restitution programme in 2009. 3  We explore the story of 
Schaaphoek’s redistribution through the experiences of three individuals: 
 
Thomas M, who was a sometime farm worker there; Mr R, who leased part of the property 
for a few years; and Dr Sadiki, the LRAD beneficiary. 
 
Thomas M was born in 1950 on Schaaphoek into a labour tenant family, and began 
working on the farm from the age of nine. At 17, he migrated to Johannesburg, where he 
worked in menial jobs for about 30 years. In his late forties, he decided to return to 
Limpopo, and moved from one farm job to another. In 2003, he ended up working on 
Schaaphoek again, but resided in a communal area village nearby. In 2005, Schaaphoek 
was bought by Dr Sadiki, a medical doctor based in Polokwane, the provincial capital, 
with the support of an LRAD grant. Dr Sadiki increased Thomas’ wage relative to what he 
earned under the previous owner. Even so, when Thomas passed away in 2008, he died a 
poor farm worker, his circumstances not very different from those he experienced as a 
teenager. 
 
Thomas’ life history is probably typical of many farm workers turned migrants, whose life 
chances are not much improved by their stay in the urban economy. Some returned 
migrants, however, manage to accumulate some capital while working in the city and 
establish small businesses on their return to rural areas (see Neves and du Toit in this 
special issue). Mr R, for example, was also born on Schaaphoek, and at around the same 
time as Thomas, but managed to secure employment as a bus driver in Johannesburg for 
20 years and received a modest severance package when his employment ended. Upon 
returning to Limpopo in 1991, he bought a truck and began hauling sand for building 
purposes, and then established a small butchery in Maila, the communal area village 
adjacent to Schaaphoek. He also purchased cattle, which he kept on the commons around 
the village. In around 1995, Mr R approached the Department of Land Affairs for 
assistance to acquire land, and believes he is ‘on the list’ to get such land. However, he has 
never heard back from Land Affairs, and has never pursued the matter further. The reality 
is that there is no such list, and it is unlikely that he will ever hear from government 
regarding his ‘application’. 
 
In the meantime, Dr Sadiki purchased the nearby Schaaphoek farm, and Mr R began 
leasing some of the farm’s grazing land for his cattle. This suited Dr Sadiki, because the 
land leased to Mr R served as a buffer between Maila and the rest of Dr Sadiki’s farm. 
Indeed, the white farmer who preceded Dr Sadiki at Schaaphoek had used precisely the 
same strategy to protect his grazing from villagers’ livestock. Having such a buffer was all 
the more important to Dr Sadiki because of his heavy professional and business 
commitments in the provincial capital, which allowed him to visit his farm for only a few 
                                                 
3
 Apparently, when the land was transferred to Dr Sadiki in 2005, the section of the Department of Land Affairs 
responsible for land redistribution was not aware of the fact that the farm was subject to a land claim. 
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hours a week. He thus earned the epithet ‘cellphone farmer’, which was increasingly used 
after the rollout of the LRAD programme.  
 
At some stage, government officials realised that Schaaphoek was subject to a land 
restitution claim by the Nthabalala Royal Council, which subsumes the neighbouring 
community of Maila. In 2009, the state acquired the farm from Dr Sadiki, who was paid 
out several times the value of his total investment in Schaaphoek. The consequence for Mr 
R was ironic: as a member of the claimant community, he was now a part owner of 
Schaaphoek but no longer had exclusive access to a section of the farm, and was unsure 
whether it was still worth his while to maintain the watering point and other 
infrastructure that he had used as a tenant of Dr Sadiki. 
 
Mr R’s story shows that, in contrast to Thomas, the capital he accumulated while a 
migrant worker meant that he had various options on his return to Limpopo, albeit that, 
in contrast to Dr Sadiki, he did not have sufficient resources to enable him to acquire his 
own land. 
 
 
 
As a restitution beneficiary, Mr R was uncertain whether his cattle farming would be 
constrained by the fact that the effective claimant group was large relative to the grazing 
capacity of Schaaphoek farm.4 Also of interest is that Thomas’ relationship to the new 
farm owner was little different to that which had obtained in the past. The maintenance of 
Schaaphoek as a large-scale commercial farm meant that the authoritative character of 
the owner–worker relationship was preserved, even though Dr Sadiki may have been a 
slightly more generous employer than his predecessor, possibly because he had access to 
sources of income other than farming. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The claim lodged by the Nthabalala Royal Council included only about fifty households, Chief Nthabalala 
acknowledged that at the time of compiling the list, many community members did not see the purpose of including 
their names, or were living elsewhere and could not be contacted. Chief Nthabalala’s expectation was that once the 
land was restored, more households belonging to the community would be interested. Indeed, as of late 2011, more 
than forty households had settled on the part of Schaaphoek near the main road. Otherwise, the land is used for 
communal grazing. It is not clear whether competition for grazing has increased.  
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Trajectories of LRAD-based projects.  
The four LRAD project case studies have trajectories that are simple and similar to one 
another (Figure 2). The main difference among them is that in two of these projects 
(Springkaan and Goedgedacht Estate) the main beneficiary became a full-time farmer, 
while in the other two (Sadiki Cattle Enterprise and Karishume) he became a part-time 
farmer. While each of these farms is managed by one individual, typically the ‘official 
beneficiaries’ include both this individual and a handful of close relatives; in one instance 
(Goedgedacht Estate), the individual managing the farm is not an official beneficiary at 
all; rather, he runs the farm on behalf of his uncle and cousins. One implication is that the 
official statistics regarding LRAD beneficiaries are highly misleading, albeit not to the 
same extent as with SLAG. 
 
To date, there is little discernible variation in the paths of the LRAD projects, apart from 
the disruption caused to Sadiki Cattle Enterprise when its land was taken back for a 
restitution claim, and the expected disruption to Goedgedacht Estate for the same reason. 
The livelihood implications of the trajectory thus far appear to be modestly negative to 
modestly positive, mainly depending on the degree to which the new owner has succeeded 
in overcoming initial obstacles to establishing him- or herself as a farmer. Thus 
Springkaan appeared to be losing money, but with the promise of becoming profitable in 
the near future; Dr Sadiki was on the threshold of breaking even before he had to 
surrender his farm. Goedgedacht Estate and Karishume were doing modestly and very 
well, respectively, due to different levels of technical competence, marketing acumen and 
initial resources available. 
 
One interesting feature of the Karishume and Springkaan cases is diversified and 
intensified production subsequent to redistribution. For Springkaan, this involved 
expanding the beef cattle enterprise and adding irrigated vegetables. This was not difficult 
because the cattle production system at the time of land acquisition was not very 
intensive. Karishume started with broiler production and then, within the very small 
amount of land available to it, both expanded the broiler operation and diversified into 
vegetable production. 
 
The possible future trajectories indicated by the first set of dashed lines merely suggest 
different ‘points’ along a continuum of success/failure with different logical outcomes, 
namely that land remains in use by the individual or family, that it is sold in the market or 
leased out (in which case it is more than likely to return to white ownership and/or use) 
or that it is returned to land reform, which is especially likely if it is repossessed due to an 
unserviced Land Bank loan. ‘De-capitalization’ refers to what has been observed on a 
large number of other failed land reform projects, where farm improvements are 
vandalized or fall into disrepair.  
 
Are there other possible trajectories? It was clear from the project census that among 
projects where nothing was happening at the time of the interviews, a fair number were 
LRAD projects. The apparent robustness of our case studies should not be taken to imply 
that LRAD projects are inevitably successful: the more common trajectory is one of 
extinction. 
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Is diversification a means of promoting survival? It is clear that diversification can 
promote a more sustained cash flow; thus the owner of Goedgedacht Estate, for example, 
whose main focus is on cattle production, relies on cash crops to generate enough income 
with which to pay his workers. Diversification has its own risks: investment in irrigation 
infrastructure by the owner of Springkaan may well prove a great benefit, but having lost 
his first cabbage crop to pests and his first tomato crop to frost, the outlay has placed him 
in a vulnerable situation in the short term. 
 
The influence of the LSCF model is most obvious in the case of LRAD-based projects. 
LRAD projects are designed to approximate the LSCF model closely. To some extent, 
LRAD has been successful in terms of its own objectives but, interestingly, this is due not 
only to the ability to adopt the previous owners’ farm plan, but to some beneficiaries’ 
success in intensifying land use. It is clear that the farming systems put in place by LRAD 
beneficiaries do not depart radically from what the previous owners were doing, although, 
at Springkaan and Goedgedacht Estate, there is evidence that beneficiaries have exerted 
themselves to intensify land use and diversify enterprise mix compared with the previous 
owners. 
 
Restitution Projects: Case study of Vleifontein farm/Mavungeni.  
The history of the Mavungeni land claim to Vleifontein farm involves dispossession and 
the imposition of labour tenancy on those who lost their land, a common pattern in this 
part of Limpopo (Manenzhe and Lahiff 2007). After the initiation of the land restitution 
programme in 1994, two different groups lodged claims for Vleifontein farm; these claims 
were then consolidated through the encouragement of the Restitution Commission. The 
final, consolidated claim was finalized in 2002 on behalf of 200 claimant households; as 
with many restitution projects in Limpopo, the final tally of claimant households is an 
implausibly round figure. 
 
The restored land comprises a 745 hectare portion of the farm Vleifontein, wedged 
between one of the few remaining white-owned commercial farms in the area and 
Vleifontein, a rural township of around 6,100 people. For the previous 30 years, the 
property had been state land; a 25 hectare fruit orchard had been leased to the white 
commercial farmer next door, a few hectares were used on an informal basis by township 
residents for dryland crop production, and the rest was more or less idle. 
 
A CPA was formed and a CPA committee elected to represent its interests. However, the 
Mavungeni claim comprises a complex overlay of conflicts, both historical and current in 
nature. The core issue in relation to which the claimant group is overtly divided is 
settlement: where on the farm should settlement be allowed, and what kind of 
settlement? One view is that the settlement should be located as close to Vleifontein 
township as possible, to link up with the bulk service infrastructure that already exists in 
the township (water, sanitation, electricity and so on). In this vision – detailed in a plan 
developed by a consultant in 2005 – the Mavungeni settlement would be either an 
extension of the township or, alternatively, a new township adjacent to Vleifontein, with 
subsidized housing, business sites, a school and sites for two churches (Manenzhe and 
Lahiff 2007, 12). Another feature of this plan is that it provides for an expansion of 
commercial agriculture on the farm, building on an earlier business plan, commissioned 
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by a different consultant, which stated that much of the land was suitable for crop farming 
and fruit orchards. 
 
The opposing view is that of a group of ‘invaders’, who preferred not to wait for formal 
township development and wanted to establish their own homesteads on the land as soon 
as possible. By 2008, these ‘invaders’ had demarcated more than thirty plots, on which 
some had erected rudimentary shelters, and were engaged in small-scale farming of maize 
and other crops. These plots were not near to Vleifontein township, but were clustered 
along the northern boundary of the property, which happens to coincide with a tarred 
road, allowing easy access to nearby towns such as Elim. After 2008, however, the 
number of land users and residents seen as ‘invaders’ dwindled somewhat, apparently 
because they felt intimidated by threats of litigation by the other faction, or by the local 
municipality. In the words of the man widely regarded as the de facto leader of the 
invaders, James: ‘Those who do not want us to be here are not hungry.’ 
 
By this, he meant that the invaders were there out of need, whereas those opposing them 
had the leisure of waiting for their formal plans to unfold. ‘Invaders’ also commonly 
accuse those opposing them of wishing to lease out the land to neighbouring commercial 
farmer; according to James, such people are ‘. . . traitors who are lazy and believe in the 
white man’s magic of farming and think that a black person cannot farm’. 
 
One of those most vehemently opposed to the ‘invaders’, Ezekiel, expressed his concerns 
thus: ‘They want Mavungeni to become like Munzhedzi; they are invaders because they 
are violating the plan.’ (Munzhedzi is the name of a restitution project on the other side of 
Vleifontein township, where almost 1,000 households have established homesteads; see 
below.) It is not clear that these two competing visions for the future at Mavungeni are 
incompatible. It is unlikely that commercial farming on a large scale will be initiated in 
the short to medium term, and proximity to the main road appears to be the crucial 
consideration for the location of plots established by the ‘invaders’. In other words, there 
is little reason to expect that, left unchecked, spontaneous settlement at Mavungeni would 
extend significantly southwards on to land suitable for farming.5 5  Another concern 
expressed by Ezekiel is that the ‘invaders’ are not all bona fide claimants. Some 
acknowledge that they are not on the official claimant list, but assert that they are related 
to those who are, and that if the CPA committee would only agree to conduct a review of 
its membership, it would soon discover that their grandparents had links to the land and 
thus that they should be counted among the claimants. 
 
James himself claims that he was born on Vleifontein farm in 1966, and his parents were 
also born there. James was 3 years old when the family was removed to Riverplaas, about 
10 kilometres south-east, in what was then considered the Venda ‘homeland’. After living 
                                                 
5
 The other instance of an alleged conflict of interest between the ‘invaders’ and the proponents of ‘the plan’ is that the 
settlement near the road is very close to a war memorial that forms part of the so-called ‘Zoutpansberg skirmishes 
route’. This is a recent attempt supported by Soutpansberg Tourism and private tourism operators to create a tourist 
attraction from a collection of sites in northern Limpopo associated with episodes from the South African (Anglo-
Boer) war. According to Ezekiel, the presence of the ‘invaders’ reduces the possibility that the Mavungeni community 
will find a way to capitalize on ‘their’ tourist stop: ‘They have destroyed everything, they have stopped development, 
they are destroying the attraction there. ‘The irony is rich: a black claimant community seeking to benefit  conomically 
from a tourist site that marks the contest between two white powers for control over black people’s land. 
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and working in Johannesburg for some years, he returned with a wife and children to 
Limpopo at the age of 38, and learned that the Mavungeni land claim had been successful. 
When the CPA committee rejected his request to use some of the land for farming, he 
decided to invade. 
 
Shortly thereafter, he started crop farming, which he credits with saving his family from 
poverty. In a typical year, he produces more than enough maize to meet his household’s 
needs, and he takes the surplus to his parents and other relatives who remain at 
Riverplaas. 
 
A good example of someone who is ‘not hungry’ is Jonas M, a retired school principal who 
now serves as Deputy Secretary of the CPA committee. He was born on the farm 
Vleifontein farm in 1941, and grew up there with his parents. His father was a farm 
supervisor, and was on good terms with the farm manager at the time. This probably 
explains why Jonas’ family was not removed from the farm at the same time as most of 
the others. Jonas’ family was still present on the farm when Jonas attended a teacher 
training course and was then employed at a nearby school. Jonas had twenty-nine cattle 
on the farm, for which he was supposed to pay a grazing fee, but by 2009 the CPA had yet 
to decide on what these fees should be. Although Jonas is respected by other beneficiaries 
and is an influential member of the CPA committee, some feel that he capitalizes on 
divisions within the CPA membership to exploit project resources such as funds, access to 
grazing and the use of the project’s tractor. 
 
Trajectories of restitution projects. 
Restitution projects in central-north Limpopo are highly diverse, partly because some are 
established on unutilized land (Munzhedzi), while others involve the restitution of 
subtropical fruit plantations (e.g. Levubu) or even nature reserves (Manavhela). Even so, 
many of them face similar challenges, such as complex internal group dynamics, 
opportunism by some claimants at the expense of others and contested decisions 
regarding land use (e.g. settlement versus production). 
 
Abstracting from the complexities, we note six distinct observed trajectories, one possible 
(non-observed) trajectory and one noteworthy ‘non-trajectory’ (Figure 3). The trajectories 
include: spontaneous settlement (Munzhedzi, and to a limited degree Mavungeni); the 
use of land for communal grazing (Munzhedzi and Mavungeni, although these were not 
necessarily dominant land uses there); the use of the land for group-based production 
(Manavhela and, to a limited degree, Munzhedzi); the use of the land for individual 
production (Munzhedzi and Morebene); entering into a strategic partnership (the Levubu 
cluster and Manavhela); and leasing out (Manavhela, Morebene and Magkato).The non-
observed trajectory (dashed arrow) is ‘planned settlement’, as distinct from the 
unplanned settlement of Munzhedzi. The stalled township development at Mavungeni 
described above is a case in point. To reflect these frustrated processes, we refer to them 
as a ‘non-trajectory’ of ‘waiting’: the idea of things not happening whether because of lack 
of common will, expected resources or someone to take decisive action. 
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But ‘waiting’ is not only to do with stalled settlement. At Morebene, the majority of the 
restored farms have stood idle for several years. At Magkato, a vast restitution project 
west of Morebeng, the gerontocracy that is the project committee spoke wistfully of 
farming the land as in the old days, but acknowledged that their children and 
grandchildren had no interest; thus nothing happened. 
 
What of the next phase/stage of these trajectories? From ‘spontaneous settlement’, a 
possible future course might be formalization and/or service provision by local 
government. At Munzhedzi, formalization has not happened, although some service 
provision (e.g. electricity) has begun, albeit slowly and imperfectly. ‘Group production’ is 
pursued in different ways in our sample, but mostly at a small scale. At Munzhedzi, there 
were a couple of small animal husbandry projects initiated with the support of a local 
NGO; the piggery closed down after 2 years, while the broiler project was still carrying on 
as of 2010, but with only a couple of individuals remaining active from the original dozen. 
While neither of these group enterprises was closely examined as part of this study, the 
impression is that they began struggling as soon as external support was withdrawn due 
to weak cash flow and poor management. Similarly, at Manavhela the group-based crop 
production enterprise collapsed within 2 years of being started, and the broiler enterprise 
a few years later, while the nature reserve has operated at a very low level (e.g. paying 
guests relative to capacity) since a year after transfer. For ‘subdivision’, the only example 
we have is Munzhedzi and the relatively small cluster of homesteads at Mavungeni. While, 
in principle, it is conceivable that consolidation could take place – even of the agricultural 
plots established apart from the area demarcated for settlement – it is difficult to imagine 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
19 
 
this happening, especially given that there are so many households and so little land 
seemingly available. From the ‘enter partnership’ scenario, it is possible that the 
partnership will carry on indefinitely, but at both Levubu and Manavhela these 
partnerships crumbled within 2–3 years. The Manavhela group sought a new partner in 
the hope that it would help stabilize the project in the face of chronic infighting; however, 
this arrangement itself lasted only a few months. Strategic partners tend to underestimate 
the complexity of working with ‘communities’, or find that government co-financing is 
tardy, or both. Radical restructuring, however, will always remain an option, if only in the 
background; for Levubu, this could, for example, involve subdividing the farms to create 
opportunities for small-scale orchard production. 
 
The case that stood as out as benefitting large numbers of people was Munzhedzi, which 
did not proceed according to any plan, but was a restitution project ‘gone wrong’. The 
land claimed was unused state land. After its transfer to the claimants’ CPA, a self-
appointed ‘chief ’ began demarcating plots and allocating them to anyone willing to pay a 
modest fee. The committee elected to manage the land on behalf of the claimants was 
unable to counteract the activities of the ‘chief ’, one consequence of which was that as of 
2009, there were 170 claimant households settled on the land plus around 800 non-
claimant households, many of which had relocated from nearby communal areas, but 
some also from 40 kilometres or further afield.66 The plots occupied by claimant and 
non-claimant households are intermingled and indistinguishable, and mainly consist of 
fenced plots measuring roughly 30 by 50 metres, containing self-built dwellings and 
gardens. About twenty to thirty of these residents – including both claimants and non-
claimants – also farm somewhat larger plots situated on the sloping terrain south of the 
settled part of Munzhedzi, and there is space for more such plots. Two dominant themes 
emerge from interviews at Munzhedzi: people appreciate the better agricultural 
conditions there, and its convenient location, close to a reasonably busy transport route 
from which they can get to local economic centres. As expressed by one woman who had 
settled at Munzhedzi, ‘We are next to the road and the land is beautiful.’ It would appear 
that Munzhedzi addressed a kind of land need not catered for in land reform policy. 
 
The LSCF model is evident in restitution first and foremost in the effort to maintain the 
production systems of the former commercial farms that occupied the land. In some 
instances, this led to outcomes similar to SLAG-based projects, though arguably worse 
because of even greater numbers of beneficiaries; in others, the Restitution Commission 
deliberately sought to prevent problems associated with large group claims by bringing in 
a strategic partner. The case of Munzhedzi stands out in that it had no ‘current use’ to 
maintain, which together with other specific features, allowed a land-use pattern to 
emerge based on informal subdivision, with little resemblance to the other restitution 
projects examined, never mind the LSCF model. Mavungeni in a sense is torn between 
                                                 
6
 According to the chairperson of the CPA committee, ‘If it was only claimants on this land, this settlement would 
have looked different; if it was the CPA committee allocating – it would look different, for example the streets are not 
planned, we would have made the houses a bit far apart . . .’ However, he indicated that claimants resigned themselves 
to sharing the property with non-claimants, and separate focus group discussions held with claimant and non-claimant 
households also indicated a high level of acceptance and lack of hostility. One reason may be that many non-claimant 
residents are related to claimants. Interviews suggest that that many claimant households did not move back to 
Munzhedzi as they did not any advantage in doing so. Non-relocation to restored land is common in land restitution 
(see, e.g.,Walker 2008). 
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competing visions of agriculture, with some preferring Munzhedzi-style homesteads that 
allow for small-scale agriculture, and others holding out for the commercial farm 
development promised in the consultant’s plan. 
 
Contested farm models, social differentiation and livelihoods 
The study confirms the wide-scale failure and collapse of land reform projects in central-
north Limpopo, but also: (1) highlights that even where projects have not failed, the 
benefits can be quite limited; and (2) identifies specific circumstances in which land 
reform has provided access to land that has enhanced the livelihoods of poor people. 
 
We argue that the diverse outcomes are best understood in relation to the different ways 
in which application of the LSCF model has interacted with or informed the three main 
types of redistributive land reform projects. In short, the LSCF model conditions how 
agriculture is organized in land reform projects, who is involved in land reform and how 
different types ofpeople relate to one another on transferred land. 
 
Farm dwellers and migrant workers are found in all three project types, but are employees 
(rather than land owners) in LRAD projects. Communal area dwellers and communal 
area farmers are almost systematically neglected by land redistribution: to the extent that 
either group featured in our case studies, it was generally as recruits to help populate 
SLAG applications that neglected their circumstances and interests, while for LRAD 
projects, communal area dwellers and farmers faced hurdles similar to those of farm 
workers and farm dwellers. Communal area dwellers tend to be beneficiaries in 
restitution rather than redistribution projects. Communal area farmers, however, are 
found in very few projects, with the important implication that their farming skills are not 
transferred to redistributed land. Middleclass beneficiaries such as teachers, civil servants 
and successful businessmen tend to be managers or investors in (resurrected) SLAG 
projects or in LRAD projects, and are also found in some restitution projects. 
 
For SLAG-based redistribution projects, it is deference to the LSCF model that accounted 
for the generally unworkable project design, whereby a large beneficiary group attempted 
to maintain the production system of the previous commercial farmer. Because 
commercial farms in Limpopo and elsewhere had generally been designed over the years 
to rely as little as possible on labour, this meant that most beneficiaries were redundant 
from the outset. Rather than seeking to replicate or build on the labour-intensive, 
individualized production systems of the ‘communal areas’, group-based agriculture was 
encouraged or imposed within the commercial LSCF context, in the absence of robust 
farm management and despite some group members having contrary preferences. The 
result was collapsed projects; and on those that did not collapse, a dramatic attrition of 
beneficiaries. Curiously, subdivision was generally not effected as a means of rendering 
conditions more tenable, suggesting the tenacious grip of the LSCF model despite the 
possibility that some beneficiaries recruited from the communal areas might have 
preferred to subdivide. Perhaps the LSCF model has generally won out because SLAG 
projects have tended to be established around a core of former farm workers, to whom the 
LSCF model was familiar and attractive, as illustrated by the case of Makhamotse. 
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The end result was that for those SLAG projects that adjusted and survived, a few former 
farm workers did benefit, and might in future develop and benefit further. However, the 
dominant pattern is the loss of farm-worker jobs, and virtually no new livelihood 
opportunities for residents of communal areas. 
 
The influence of the LSCF model is most obvious in the case of LRAD-based 
redistribution projects, where a conscious attempt was made to ensure continuity with the 
farming practices of the previous owner, inevitably a large-scale commercial farmer. 
Indeed, the LRAD policy was designed with the idea of promoting continuity in 
recognition that SLAG-based projects did not work, and adherence to this principle at 
project level is due to the shared view of government planners and applicants. 
 
Although the project census revealed that LRAD projects were as likely to collapse as 
SLAG-based redistribution projects and restitution projects, those that did not collapse 
tended to fare reasonably well, and without major adjustments. From a livelihoods 
perspective, however, LRAD projects contributed little to poverty reduction because they 
were elite-oriented, which the very modest labour intensification observed on some 
projects did little to compensate. LRAD conspicuously failed to incorporate the poor and 
vulnerable as its main beneficiaries, precisely because it succeeded in replacing seller-
driven land reform in the form of SLAG with applicant/beneficiary-driven land reform, 
which meant that it was the better-off, better educated and well-connected who sought 
and got assistance. For South Africa as a whole, between 2001–2 and 2005–6, only about 
3,900 households benefitted from LRAD per year, while between 2006–7 and 2008–9 
there were fewer than 2,000 households, despite annual expenditure in excess of R1 
billion (Aliber et al. (forthcoming)). 
 
This merely echoes what was observed above about the relative (and increasing) 
marginality of central-north Limpopo’s commercial agriculture sector from a livelihoods 
perspective. Moreover, to the extent that LRAD succeeded in allowing the continuity of 
large-scale commercial farming, it also perpetuated unequal social relations between 
owners and workers. In other words, LRAD projects tend to maintain a strict class-based, 
farm management hierarchy that is absent in SLAG-based projects and perhaps helps to 
explain why they fail as commercial farms. In other words, where the LSCF model is 
applied to land reform, it imposes an invidious choice between non-functional equity 
(SLAG) or functional inequity (LRAD). In a sense, restitution projects tend to be extreme 
versions of SLAG-based projects, characterized by continuity with previous land use, but 
with beneficiary numbers that are large even by the standards of SLAG. Another typical 
feature of restitution projects in central-north Limpopo is that they have taken on 
‘strategic partners’ as a means of ensuring good management, in the absence of which 
large group size would be especially destabilizing, But this again is predicated on 
maintaining the LSCF model in place, rather than seeking ways of altering land use to suit 
the needs and capabilities of beneficiaries. The exception noted above, of Munzhedzi, can 
perhaps be partially explained by the fact there was no prior commercial farming 
enterprise to maintain – the land had been effectively idle. Moreover, the lack of effective 
control by the CPA committee allowed a more spontaneous expression of need, namely 
land for homesteads with productive conditions for gardening and some smallholder 
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production. The ‘invaders’ at Mavungeni also demonstrate alternatives to the ‘white man’s 
magic of farming’: small-scale farming for home consumption and sale. 
 
Taking SLAG, LRAD and restitution together, it is apparent that poverty reduction 
benefits are mainly available to those who fall outside the intended project plans. And, 
strangely enough, these opportunities appear to be concentrated in restitution, where the 
main design parameters of ‘which land for whom’ are beyond the reach of policy-makers 
and implementers. The reason is perhaps that restitution is even more apt to lead to 
dramatic levels of conflict. It seeks to impose a socio-political unity, for example, by 
reaffirming the cadastral property boundaries bequeathed from the colonial era, on the 
assumption that this is an adequate depiction of claimants’ lost ‘property’; by 
consolidating the claims of distinct groups for the convenience of post-1994 government 
administration; by finalizing claimant lists for the same purpose; and by requiring 
claimant groups to form CPAs and elect officers. However, attempting to match a finite, 
formally represented group to a well-defined unit of land suggests a socio-political unity 
that often does not exist in practice. The conflict that tends to follow opens up space for 
the sort of invasions that have occurred at Munzhedzi and Mavungeni. 
 
Two types of beneficiaries have been systematically neglected by land reform in Limpopo. 
Although government appears to have always regarded farm workers and farm dwellers 
as a key target group, SLAG and LRAD have done little to benefit farm workers in 
practice. For LRAD, the applicant-led nature of the application process has meant that 
farm workers are relatively unlikely to apply; there is a clear bias in favour of those who 
possess better-than-average resources, education and social networks, which farm 
workers and dwellers by and large lack. By contrast, SLAG, because it has lent itself to 
seller-driven projects, has gravitated almost unerringly towards farm workers but, as 
argued above, often in a manner that marginalizes them even further rather than 
providing real benefits. Communal area dwellers and farmers have also been neglected by 
land redistribution.To the extent that either category has benefited, it has generally been 
as recruits to help populate SLAG applications with little relevance to their situation or 
their interests. For LRAD projects, communal area dwellers and farmers have faced 
hurdles similar to those of farm workers and farm dwellers. Because of this, the large 
proportion of black farmers who are women have derived little benefit from land 
redistribution. Significantly, the one case study project that did accommodate communal 
area dwellers and farmers – Munzhedzi – was the one that was least planned. 
 
Livelihoods after land reform in Namibia and Zimbabwe 
The problematic application of the LSCF model to land reform in central-north Limpopo 
is explained above in terms of the particularities of South Africa’s land reform 
programme. However, even in land reform policy contexts that are quite different, the 
LSCF model is found wanting. This section summarizes findings from the Namibian and 
Zimbabwean components of the LaLR study, focusing on the constraints experienced in 
applying the LSCF model or, alternatively, the advantages of not applying it. 
 
Namibia 
Namibia is a largely arid and semi-arid country, in which most agricultural production is 
extensive livestock ranching. Only 8 per cent of the country receives an average annual 
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rainfall of more than 500 millimetres (Werner and Odendaal 2010, 18). The government’s 
land redistribution programme involves purchasing large-scale commercial farms from 
‘willing sellers’, subdividing them and allocating the new units to ‘small-scale commercial 
farmers’. The main resettlement model is the Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme (FURS), in 
which individual beneficiaries are allocated a ‘small farm’ (i.e. small relative to local 
norms), specified as a minimum of 1,000 hectares in the wetter areas of the north of the 
country, and 3,000 hectares in the drier south. They then enter into a long-term lease 
agreement with the government (Werner and Kruger 2007, 13).An Affirmative Action 
Loan Scheme (AALS) provides funds for purchase of commercial farms by black 
Namibians, with the objective of encouraging large herd owners from communal areas to 
‘become fully-fledged commercial farmers’ (ibid., 14). A minimum of 150 Large Stock 
Units (LSU) must be owned by applicants for AALS loans, which are subsidized for the 
first 10 years. By 2005, a total of 625 farms across the country had been acquired through 
AALS, compared to 163 farms under FURS (ibid., 17). 
 
The LaLR project in Namibia examined the livelihood impacts of land redistribution in 
two regions, Hardap and Omaheke. The study involved the collection of both quantitative 
and qualitative data on a small sample: nineteen FURS beneficiaries in Hardap and 
twenty in Omaheke, together with ten AALS farmers in Hardap and five in Omaheke. 
Typologies of different livelihood trajectories were developed for all three models, based 
on the diverse livelihood strategies pursued by beneficiaries.  
 
Werner and Odendaal argue that for the objective of establishing self-supporting small-
scale commercial farming, the current FURS model ‘does not appear to be commercially 
viable or financially sustainable’ (2010, 166). Minimum farm sizes of 1,000 hectares in the 
north and 3,000 hectares in the south have the potential, when climatic conditions are 
optimal, to generate gross margins of N$37,500 and N$60,480 per annum respectively, 
insufficient for capital investments for maintenance and replacement of fencing and 
boreholes. At recommended stocking rates, it would be impossible for a FURS farmer to 
ever attain the minimum herd size (of 150 LSU) required to qualify for an AALS loan, and 
thus ‘graduate’ to large-scale commercial farming (ibid., 166–7, 170). In Omaheke, the 
FURS model does not cater for farmers with herds more than 70 LSU (the maximum on 
1,000 hectares, at recommended stocking rates) but less than 150 LSU (ibid., 121). But in 
most cases, actual farm sizes are much smaller than these ‘minimums’. 
 
The study concludes that the prevailing models for resettlement are ‘limited and 
restrictive’, ‘too narrow’ and ‘not well matched with the needs, aspirations and 
expectations of many beneficiaries, particularly those who have few assets. Current land 
reform thinking assumes that every beneficiary intends to become a small-scale or large-
scale farmer’, but beneficiaries are more differentiated than is commonly recognized 
(ibid., 168). Other policy options, such as small-scale irrigation schemes for urban 
markets, enlargement of communal areas, co-operative ranching or joint ventures, have 
not been explored to date. One key issue is farm size, which is a key constraint on 
beneficiaries who try to expand their herd sizes and aspire to acquire a larger farm 
through an AALS loan. The ‘rigidity’ of the FURS model constrains accumulation (ibid., 
121).Werner and Odendaal recommend a review of resettlement models, farm sizes and 
beneficiary selection criteria, as well as clarification of the leasehold land rights of 
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beneficiaries, more effective post-settlement support, investment in infrastructure and 
coordinated planning (ibid., 172–6). 
 
Zimbabwe 
The Zimbabwe study has been reported in a book and two journal papers (Scoones et al. 
2010, 2011, 2012) and its findings widely debated. Research was undertaken on land 
formerly held as large-scale commercial farms, subject to farm occupations after 2000, 
and transferred under the Fast Track Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). Field work was 
undertaken at sixteen sites and four research clusters across Masvingo province, much of 
which is dry, averaging less than 500 millimetres of rain per annum. (Scoones et al. 2010, 
38–41). Former land uses included extensive livestock ranching on most farms, and 
irrigation farming (including sugar cane) at a few sites. On the basis of the study’s 
findings, the authors argue that five widely held ‘myths’ about land reform in Zimbabwe 
have little empirical basis in Masvingo province: that agricultural production has 
collapsed following the FTLRP, food insecurity is widespread, the rural economy is in 
rapid decline, little new investment in land has occurred and the beneficiaries of land 
reform have been political ‘cronies’ of the ruling party (ibid., 8). The study’s findings 
contradict these stereotypes, and show that while the effects of post-2000 land reform in 
Zimbabwe are complex, differentiated and dynamic, secondary data suggest that the 
situation in Masvingo is not unique. The findings also reveal sharp differences with South 
Africa and Namibia, as well as some similarities. 
 
One key difference with South Africa and Namibia is that land redistribution has radically 
reconfigured Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure. By 2008–9, over 4,500 large-scale 
commercial farms, comprising 7.6 million hectares in total, had been redistributed to over 
145,000 households in the smallholder-oriented A1 resettlement schemes, with around 
16,500 beneficiaries occupying medium-scale, commercial farms, the A2 model. There are 
also many ‘informal’ resettlement sites not yet recognized by the government. Some larger 
A2 farms, akin to the large-scale commercial farms of the past, have been allocated more 
recently, and Moyo (2011, 497) suggests that total land allocations under FTLRP now 
amount to 9 million hectares. In 2011, around 3.4 million hectares were still under large-
scale farms, some in very large holdings, with about 200 white farmers occupying 117,000 
hectares, and black Zimbabweans owning around 950 large farms (ibid., 514). Including 
communal areas and ‘old’ (pre-2000) resettlement schemes, 98 per cent of all farms in 
Zimbabwe are now smallholdings (Scoones et al. 2010, 6; Moyo 2011, 942). 
 
The FTLRP instituted radical shifts in agrarian structure in Masvingo province, too. 
About 28 per cent of the total land area, or 1.2 million hectares, was transferred to 32,500 
households on A1 sites, and to 1,200 households on A2 farms, with 8,500 households in 
informal sites (Scoones et al. 2010, 33–4). The average size of the A1 farms in the study 
was 37 hectares, including cropping and grazing land, compared to a mean of 318 
hectares for A2 farms – but in practice there are many similarities between smaller A2 
farms and a variant of the A1 model, the ‘self-contained A1 schemes’, which include 
individual grazing land, in contrast to the communal grazing of the A1 ‘villagized’ model 
(ibid., 95). 
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The study found that trends in the levels of production and sales of surplus were highly 
differentiated by climatic zone, type of resettlement model and ‘success group’ within 
each site.7 Maize production data between 2003 and 2009 shows gradual increases in 
total output at each site over this period, but with declines in severe drought years (ibid., 
108). An increasing proportion of farmers at each site and resettlement model have been 
able to produce over a tonne of maize (the amount required for food self-sufficiency for a 
family of six), but mainly through expanding the area under maize rather than through 
yield increases (ibid., 111).  
 
Production and sales vary considerably between success groups (SGs) 1 to 3; for example, 
in the A1 self-contained sites, some 65 per cent of SG1 sold twenty-one or more bags of 
maize in 2008–9, compared to 26 per cent of SG2 and 17 per cent of SG3 (ibid., 110–11). 
Similar patterns of differentiation are evident in relation to cotton production and 
livestock ownership. In contrast to A1 schemes, many A2 farmers ‘are overwhelmed by the 
scale of their farming operations’ and have struggled to become productive, in many cases 
constrained by lack of access to capital to invest in their farms (ibid., 123). A2 farmers in 
the sugar-cane sector have been constrained by inadequate access to inputs and by 
strained relationships with corporate owned large sugar estates (ibid., 115). 
 
Technocratic approaches to rural planning have a long history in Zimbabwe and remain 
influential. Soon after farm occupations began, government officials were sent out to peg 
plots, hand out ‘offer letters’ and allocate farm units of a ‘viable’ size (ibid., 193). But 
formal planning soon ran up against informal planning by the leaders of farm 
occupations, which emphasized inclusion of beneficiaries rather than ‘viability’. The 
outcomes of land redistribution were the result of ‘a complex trade-off between local 
conditions, particular histories and contingent circumstances and the structuring forces 
of nationalist politics, technocratic planning models and local institutional arrangements, 
mediated by diverse forms of “traditional” and “modern” political authority, gender 
dynamics and social relations’. Land reform was not therefore, in this case, a top-down 
technocratic intervention (ibid., 237). 
 
In conclusion, Scoones and his co-authors argue that a decade of large-scale land 
redistribution has unleashed a process of radical agrarian change, with many enjoying 
enhanced land-based livelihoods, and novel commodity chains and market linkages of 
much potential beginning to emerge. Problems and challenges abound, however, in 
relation to insecure land tenure, unaccountable systems of land administration, and 
absent or weak support services for supplying inputs, credit, infrastructure and extension. 
The potential of the new agrarian structure to put accumulation from below on a firm 
foundation, and deliver improved livelihoods on a sustained basis, will thus require 
appropriate state polices and investments if it is be realized (ibid., 241). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Data on success groups were collected using indicators and rankings devised by local respondents in each site. 
Rankings (i.e. categorization as Success Group 1, 2 or 3) correlated with a range of quantitative indicators of success, 
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Conclusion: comparing land reform in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
Comparing key findings from the three country studies, both similarities and differences 
can be identified (see Table 3). Land reform models have varied between countries, but in 
each case project planning has been premised on the need for ‘viability’, its criteria drawn, 
explicitly or implicitly, from a hegemonic LSCF model. The inappropriate business plans 
imposed on beneficiaries in South Africa, the highly constrained nature of the ‘small-scale 
commercial farms’ established in Namibia and the lack of capital available to A2 
beneficiaries in Zimbabwe have all hamstrung land reform. In Zimbabwe, however, A1 
schemes for small-scale producers have been much less subject to the LSCF model, in part 
because of greater acknowledgement by government of the productive potential of 
smallholders, and in part because official planning was generally overtaken by local 
processes that enabled beneficiaries to make their own key decisions. The disabling 
apparatus of planning informed by the LSCF model has had less purchase, and there has 
been greater scope for beneficiary households to establish their own farming systems, 
often supported by non-farm income of various kinds. Furthermore, across all three 
countries, post-settlement support for land beneficiaries (inputs supply, extension, 
training, credit, infrastructure development, marketing etc.) has been weak and 
ineffective. 
 
As a result of inappropriate planning, a significant proportion of land reform projects or 
schemes in the research sites have ‘failed’ on the criteria of land underutilization, low 
levels of productivity and the exit of beneficiaries. The striking exception, again, is A1 
resettlement schemes (both ‘villagized’ and ‘self-contained’ versions) in Zimbabwe, where 
small-scale, household-based forms of agriculture predominate. In South Africa, the 
Munzhedzi case, where a restitution claim had ‘gone wrong’ and hundreds of non-
claimants were allocated plots, suggests the need to consider a land redistribution process 
based on the subdivision of large farms and support for small-scale, part-time farming as 
one of many livelihood sources. 
 
Overall, the impacts of land redistribution on the livelihoods of beneficiaries and others 
have been mixed in all three countries. ‘Failure’ and exit are evident to a degree, but so are 
modest to substantial improvements. The Zimbabwe study shows that many smallholders 
located on A1 schemes in Masvingo province benefited from access to an expanded land 
base and, despite recurrent drought and problems in accessing crop inputs, some are 
beginning to engage in a process of ‘accumulation from below’. Social differentiation 
before and after land reform means that across all three countries, some benefit from land 
transfers more than others; even in Zimbabwe’s A1 schemes, a significant proportion of 
beneficiaries are managing only to ‘hang in’, while others ‘drop out’. Land and agrarian 
reform by itself is clearly not the sole solution to rural poverty; complementary measures 
aimed at creating jobs and other kinds of livelihood options are needed as well. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
including ownership of assets (cattle in particular), income earning activities, agricultural production and agricultural 
sales (Scoones et al. 2010, 60). 
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The most telling contrast between the three countries in the LaLR study is in relation to 
agrarian structure: only in Zimbabwe, where the scale of land redistribution has been 
much larger than in South Africa and Namibia, has the ‘dualistic’ structure inherited from 
the past been radically transformed, at least at Masvingo. This case suggests that 
smallholder farming on subdivided commercial farms has the potential to support large 
numbers of rural producers, and that small-scale agriculture combined with other 
livelihood sources can benefit many of the rural poor. Policies premised on the 
assumption that only LSCF is ‘real agriculture’, and that land reform projects must be 
based on some version of this model to be ‘viable’, are part of the problem, and often 
contribute directly to project failure. New thinking is required to inform policy and 
planning if land reform in South Africa and Namibia is to make more than a marginal 
contribution to poverty reduction. 
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